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Abstract—Self-sovereign Identity (SSI) powered by distributed
ledger technologies enables more flexible and faster digital
identification workflows, while at the same time limiting the
control and influence of central authorities. However, a global
identity solution must be able to handle myriad credential types
from millions of issuing organizations. As metadata about types
of digital credentials is readable by everyone on the public
permissioned ledger with Hyperledger Indy, anyone could find
relevant and trusted credential types for their use cases by looking
at the records on the blockchain. To this date, no efficient full-
text search mechanism exists that would allow users to search
for credential types in a simple and efficient fashion tightly
integrated into their applications. In this work, we propose a full-
text search framework based on the publicly available metadata
on the Hyperledger Indy ledger for retrieving matching credential
types. The proposed solution is able to find credential types based
on textual input from the user by using a full-text search engine
and maintaining a local copy of the ledger. Thus, we do not need
to rely on information about credentials coming from a very large
candidate pool of third parties we would need to trust, such as
the website of a company displaying its own identifier and a
list of issued credentials. We have also proven the feasiblity of
the concept by implementing and evaluating a prototype of the
full-text credential metadata search service.
Index Terms—Self-sovereign Identity, Decentralized Identi-
fiers, Verifiable Credentials, Blockchain, Distributed Ledgers
I. INTRODUCTION
A prominent application area of blockchain technologies is
digital identity, where numerous organizations are interested
in establishing a decentralized ecosystem1. Distributed ledger
based decentralized identity solutions give more control in the
hands of the identity holder in what information they want to
disclose to other parties. The Sovrin whitepaper [1] cites that
"one seventh of the world’s population has no legal identity",
blockchain powered identity systems have the potential of
becoming the foundation of a globally available, privacy
aware, accessible by everyone means of identification while
still maintaining trust among the participants. This would be
a major game changer for identity holders, as the identity
landscape nowadays is centralized and controlled by a few
This work has been conducted within the framework of the Decentralized
Identity Management System (DIMS) project in the focus area of Digital
Finance, funded by EIT Digital.
1Decentralized Identity Foundation Website: https://identity.foundation, ac-
cessed on 28.8.2019
large players like Facebook and Google. End users do not
have control over their own identity, and customer data is sold
with little transparency and concern for the privacy of the end
user. Central identity providers are also attractive targets for
attacks, as hackers have the chance of getting sensitive data
about potentially hundreds of millions of individuals by being
able to infiltrate a single system.
When thinking about a user-centric identity framework we
would emphasize security, usability, privacy, and consent at
the same time. With self-sovereign Identity (SSI) the end users
(identity holders) have the control over their identity, that no
single central entity can take away.
The SSI movement aims to introduce privacy, security,
accessibility, and transparency by decentralization into today’s
digital identity landscape. The 10 principles of SSI formulated
by Christopher Allen include consent, protection, control,
transparency, portability, interoperability, and minimalization
[2]. The Sovrin whitepaper by Tobin and Reed [3] followed
and referenced Allen’s original blog entry [2], which envi-
sioned the Sovrin Identity Network.
The SSI role model comprises an issuer, an identity holder,
and a verifier, as depicted in Figure 1 along with our solution
for verifiable credential metadata search on the ledger. The
heart of an SSI solutions can be a public permissioned
distributed ledger, which serves as a decentralized, tamper-
proof "verifiable data registry" [4], readable by everyone. For
the sake of privacy and scalability, only minimal information
is stored on the ledger, thus minimizing the publicly available
data to essential information that needs to be accessible for all
participants in the network. The empty templates of verifiable
credentials and public keys for verification are stored on the
distributed ledger with Hyperledger Indy, because in the SSI
vision everyone needs to be able to verify the validity of a
received credential. For example, we can think about storing
the attribute names of an ID card like name, date of birth,
etc. and the respective public key along with the name of the
credential (e.g. ID card) and the identifier of the government.
Another illustration of identity with blockchain and distributed
ledgers would be to think of information about credentials
types on the ledger as the data definition language for a table in
the context of relational databases and SQL, where the actual
records of the table are each stored by the identity holders.
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Fig. 1. Verifiable Credentials Role Model and Search System Integration. The three main roles are: (1) issuer , (2) holder and (3) verifier. Another essential
component of the model is a verifiable data registry. The issuer sends credentials to the holder. Then, the holder can send presentations of the received
credentials to a verifier. The search service relies on the publicly readable Verifiable Data Registry. Source of the Verifiable Credentials Role model: W3C [4]
Applying the SSI workflow is in many use cases non-trivial,
as we can think about multiple valid identification scenarios,
like verification at the website of a bank or a government
office.
Furthermore, there are also numerous ways to identify
ourselves with various types of credentials, and verifiers need
to be able to formulate restrictions about their preferred types
of credentials and/or issuers for saving time by not having to
check received documents individually and having a higher
degree of automatization.
When developing applications powered by SSI, we have
faced the verifier’s problem of spotting the right credentials
among the information stored on the ledger, thus they can
request for proof for attributes from relevant credentials. It is
necessary for the verifier side to be able to find trustworthy
information about credentials relevant for their use cases, thus
they can decide which credentials to accept without having to
check each credential definition individually.
We propose an intuitive full-text ledger search service for
solving this problem, which enables administrators, developers
and possibly users of applications to leverage the benefits of
verifiable credentials by finding necessary information on the
ledger similar to how we search for relevant pages on the
world wide web.
For example, a company offering housing to students on its
website would like to recieve proofs of enrollment at univer-
sities nearby, thus saving precious time by reducing manual
checking. This kind of restriction can be easily configured
and maintained with our full-text ledger search by looking up
relevant types of credentials found on the Indy ledger with
textual queries.
Furthermore, issuers could also leverage the full-text search
service for finding Hyperledger Indy schemas from other
entities they want to base their credential definitions on.
Thus, the main contribution of our paper is (a) that we
have identified the need for a tightly integrated full-text ledger
search feature for flexible and usable applications utilizing
verifiable credentials, and (b) implemented it using Apache
Solr [5] for Hyperledger Indy and evaluated its performance
in order to achieve a flexible and efficient SSI workflow
in the current dynamically evolving landscape of blockchain
technologies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section
II provides an extensive overview of the state of the art
in SSI, Section III and Section IV we describe design and
implentation specific details of our full-text search system,
Section V evaluates the verifiable credential metadata search
service from various perspectives, and Section VI is about
conclusion and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Bitcoin [6], the first blockchain, was invented for creating
a peer-to-peer electronic cash system. The technology soon
became a highlight in the tech realm, and it inspired numerous
decentralized blockchains such as Ethereum [7]. Nowadays
blockchain and distributed technologies are used for other use
cases in addition to electronic payment, such as digital identity
and supply chains.
As Dunphy and Petitcolas [8] write, Namecoin2, a cryp-
tocurrency based name server for the .bit domain, pioneered
in creating "a secure and decentralised identifier-attribute map-
ping" using distributed ledger technologies, which contradicts
what is known as Zooko’s Traingle [9], that a naming system
can only satisfy 2 of the following 3 criteria: (1) secure, (2)
decentralized and (3) human-readable.
Certcoin [10] already aims at establishing a fully-fledged
Public Key Infrastructure with retention using Blockchain,
2Namecoin Website: https://www.namecoin.org/, accessed on 28.8.2019
meaning that impersonation of an already registered user is
impossible.
The Decentralized Public Key Infrastructure (DPKI) is
depicted in a whitepaper [11] co-authored by Vitalik Buterin,
Christopher Allen, Markus Sabadello, Drummond Reed and
others, that describe the current model of digital identity
controlled by third parties "results in severe usability and
security challanges Internet-wide" [11], and they argue that
DPKI addresses many of these.
The creation of anonymous credentials with blockchain is
also possible [12].
Today, there are already numerous organizations [13] who
are looking forward to leverage the potential advantages of
distributed ledger technologies for the digital identity use
cases [14] at a global scale. Still, identity is also supposed
to be interoperable, and Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and
verifiable credentials are being standardized by the world wide
web consortium.
The Bundesdruckerei in Germany is already running a
Demo-Bürgeramt pilot project [15], where we can receive dig-
ital ID card, driving license, boatmasters’ certificate, student
ID, event ticket, or parking permit verifiable credentials. The
website lets us observe an example of a simple identification
workflow using our Jolocom wallet app.
A survey from Mühle [16] provides a good overview of the
motivation behind SSI. As the SSI terminology has evolved
during the last years, we would recommend the variants from
the W3C working group [4], [17] as a point of reference.
A. Identification Workflow
The workflow of identification with verifiable credentials
fits a wide range of scenarios. For example, we can think of
a completely online process, such as opening an account on
the website of a bank, or proving our age for ordering a drink
in a bar using a zero-knowledge proof generated by an SSI
wallet app on our smartphone. In an interactive and flexible
setting, the verifier should be able to retrieve information about
different ID card issuers for creating a proof request suitable
for the specific scenario. By designing a flexible yet trusted
identification workflow we can address more use cases, thus
enabling wider usage of SSI solutions.
The preferred use case for this paper is that the verifier’s side
is using the full-text search, however it could potentially be just
as necessary for an issuer creating credentials. We can think
of multiple scenarios where the verifier’s side could benefit
from using the full-text search.
Primarily, an administrator or developer of a verifier appli-
cation can use the full-text search for specifying restrictions
about accepted credentials in an intuitive and user friendly
way, so hard-coding restrictions about credentials would not
be needed, which improves maintainability and reduces devel-
opment costs and saves time. One of several appealing specific
application scenarios for the full-text verifiable credentials
search is an online housing platform enhanced with trusted
data through SSI, where a large number of restrictions about
acceptable verifiable credentials needed to be configured like
proofs of not having rent arrears, proof of income, credit
score and an identity document for being able to apply for a
flat. There are often more specific requirements like having a
student status for being eligible for an apartment in a dormitory
close to the university. A student could also get a discount
upon showing a digital proof of matriculation when registering
online for membership at a local swimming club.
Thus, we identify a full-text ledger search service as a
key feature when developing applications leveraging the trust
benefits of SSI for achieving flexible, maintainable and effi-
cient business processes utilizing decentralized identifiers and
verifiable credentials.
B. Decentralized Identifiers
Self-sovereign identity introduces DIDs, controlled solely
by the identity holder. DIDs enable more privacy for the
identity holder, as anyone can have as many DIDs as they wish,
thus, someone can use a distinct DID for each connection,
mitigating the risk of being correlated. DIDs are currently
being standardized by the World Wide Web Consortium [17].
Several organizations are developing their own DID methods
[18], and many of these organizations are startups, such as
Jolocom [19] or Ocean Protocol [20]. The SSI community
also aims to achieve interoperability, and there is already an
open source source software, called Uniresolver [21] with the
source code available on GitHub [22], which is able to resolve
DIDs to the respective DID Document, and anyone is free
to develop drivers for their own DID methods. There is also
a software for registering DIDs, which is called Uniregistrar
[23]. DIDs are not only meant as identifers for humans, but
also for IoT devices or even data [24].
Other forms of decentralized identifiers have been pro-
posed in the past. In [25] and [26], a distributed globally
unique identification framework is proposed that uses hashes
of public keys to identify users. The solution implements a
DHT-based directory service that manages discovery of user
profiles and identity management and therefor allows users to
independently create and register identities. To benefit from
advantages of DLT, similar, even more flexible solutions have
been proposed. The Ethereum Name Service (ENS3) creates a
link between human readable identifiers and attributes such
as address or name. Similar to the Domain Name System
(DNS), top-level domains in the ENS are owned by registrar
contracts and may have sub-domains. Each domain entry in
a registrar references a separate resolver contract that stores
the associated information, such as an IP address. While the
ENS proposes a default resolver, specialized custom resolver
contracts may define additional attributes. Similar concepts
have been implemented by systems such as Namecoin [27]
or Blockstack [28].
C. Verifiable Credentials
Verifiable credentials are essentially digital versions of
physical credentials, but they are more tamper-evident by uti-
lizing cryptography. Verifiable credentials are currently being
3ENS Website; https://ens.domains/, accessed on 21.7.2019
standardized by the World Wide Web Consortium [4], and the
specifications are already at an advanced stage.
1) Sovrin and Hyperledger Indy: Sovrin [29] (envisioned
by Dmitry Khovratovich and Jason Law [30]) is an open
source, distributed ledger based identity paltform specifically
developed for SSI with a strong focus on the privacy of the
identity holder. The Sovrin foundation contributed the initial
codebase to the Hyperledger Indy project [31], furthermore
it is also an active member of the Hyperledger Aries [32]
and Ursa [33] projects. The Sovrin ledger, a deployment of
Hyperledger Indy, is run and maintained by the stewards of
the Sovrin foundation, who are responsible for maintaining
trust in the Sovrin ecosystem. Stewards of Sovrin include
Telekom Innovation Laboratories, IBM, Cisco, and several
other organizations. Stewards can grant the role trust anchor
to entities, and these entities have the right to write to the
ledger. Writing to the ledger is necessary for being able to
create verifiable credentials with Sovrin. Hyperledger Indy is
a public permissioned ledger not linked to any cryptocurrency.
However, there are plans to to introduce the Sovrin token. The
stewards run a byzantine fault tolerant consensus algorithm
[34] called the plenum protocol [35]. The Plenum protocol
is based on the PBFT algorithm [36]. With dozens of nodes
running the consensus algorithm (in case of Sovrin the Stew-
ards), BFT algorithms can achieve a throughput of thousands
of transactions per second [37].
An issuer needs to be a trust anchor, as they have to write
the respective schema and credential definitions to the ledger.
A schema has a name, a version and a number of attributes
of string type without any additional restriction. A credential
definition is created based on a schema, and it contains all
the necessary public keys per attribute needed for verification.
Issuers are able to create credential offers to identity holders
based on credential definitions written on the ledger by them.
The identity holder needs to accept the credential offer and
send a credential request. Once the issuer has received the
credential request, he/she is able to send the credential to the
identity holder. Then the identity holder stores the credential
in his/her wallet, and is able to generate proofs for each
attribute of the credential. For the part of proving, the verifier
and identity holder first need to establish a pairwise private
connection. Then the verifier sends a proof request for a
set of attributes from a number of credential definitions or
schemas to a specific identity holder. Alternatively, the verifier
can also specify the requirements about the issuer of the
credential. Then the identity holder can generate a proof for
attributes which are included in her credentials. The verifier
can verify the received proofs of validity and non-revocation
based on the credential definitions found on the ledger. Note,
that Hyperledger Indy supports revocation implemented by the
help of cryptographic accumulators to preserve the privacy of
the user. It is worth mentioning, that an identity holder is
encouraged to use a different DID for each connection, which
makes correlation more difficult, and that these private DIDs
of entities are not written on the public ledger by default.
The government of British Columbia created the Verifiable
Organizations Network (VONX) [38] based on Hyperledger
Indy. The Orgbook BC [39] lists 1.9 million verifiable orga-
nizations and 1.2 million active legal entities as of August 28,
2019.
According to Nadia Hewett (Project Lead for Blockchain,
World Economic Forum, Centre for the Fourth Industrial
Revolution), "In a data-driven, hyperconnected and digital
world, businesses need a comprehensive system for trustworthy
verification of other entities digital identity. British Columbia’s
Verifiable Organizations Network will empower businesses
with a trusted digital identity issued by their local government.
This is a prerequisite for digital optimization in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution" [39].
2) VONX Sovrin Mainnet Search: The Verifiable Orga-
nizations Network has already implemented a basic search
functionality4 for the Sovrin mainnet. However, it is lacking
essential features that our use case requires. For example, the
first transaction is authored by Phil Windley, but if we filter
the transactions for "Phil Wimdley" (where the correct way of
spelling is "Phil Windley") we get no results as of 28.8.2019.
In addition, we cannot use the VONX Sovrin Mainnet Search
for retrieving credential definitions by the name of the schema,
as this information is not included in the respective ledger
transaction. The aforementioned functionalities are already
implemented for our full-text search service making it superior
to the state of the art for our scenario. Furthermore, our use
case is also different from that of the Verifiable Organizations
Network, as we have integrated it into a verifier application, in
order to help the user find schemas and credentials of interest
easily. In other words, we imagine ledger search as a frequent
part of the SSI workflow.
3) Jolocom: Jolocom [19], [40] is a startup aiming to
decentralize identity. The design focuses on usability, security,
integrated IoT and human identity, portability, and compliance
to standards and best practices. Jolocom is referring to the
W3C DID and DDO specification and the BIP 32,39 and 44
standards for the derivation of key pairs.
4) uPort: UPort [41] is an Ethereum based SSI platform
based on DIDs and verifiable credentials. UPort products
include a Self-sovereign Wallet, Authentication and Single
sign-on (SSO) for decentralized applications, (verifiable) cre-
dentials, and soon a mobile SDK as well.
5) Veres One: The Veres One Project [42] is creating
the Veres One Network, which does not utilize a potentially
scarce and volatile ID token, but charges low and stable fees
for avoiding potential regulatory risks of speculative token
networks.
6) Ocean Protocol: Ocean Protocol envisions a decen-
tralized data sharing platform unlocking data for artificial
intelligence. The startup believes that decentralization would
make data on servers accessible for analysis. Ocean protocol’s
DID method is also part of the planned DID method registry.
4Verifiable Organizations Network Sovrin mainnet search: https://sovrin-
mainnet-browser.vonx.io/browse/domain, accessed on 28.8.2019
7) Side Trees and Microsoft ION: Sidetrees [43] are a
relatively scalable and blockchain agnostic Layer 2 protocol
for DID operations while maintaining immutability and ver-
ifiability. The higher transaction throughput is achieved by
batching multiple DID operations into a single blockchain
transaction. A Sidetree network consists of Sidetree nodes
running the Sidetree protocol, and the consensus algorithm
of the underlying blockchain helps serializing the operations
committed by different nodes. The actual DID Documents are
stored in a Distributed Content Addressable Storage (DCAS
or CAS). Running a DCAS node for Sidetree does not re-
quire running the Sidetree protocol itself in order to provide
redundancy. Microsoft has unvieled ION [44] based on the
Sidetree Protocol [43], which is said to be able to handle tens-
of-thousands of transactions [45].
8) Alastria: A National blockchain initiative from Spain
backed by multiple large companies from the country is Alas-
tria. The non-profit association is not focusing solely on SSI,
but promotes the digital economy through the development
of decentralised ledger technologies/Blockchain, according to
their website5.
9) Civic and Identity.com: Another prominent member of
the SSI movement is Civic [46], and the website Identity.com
is leveraging [47] for creating an SSI marketplace via smart
contracts facilitating payment. They also offer identity re-
quester, identity validator, and credential wallet toolkit.
III. DESIGN
A ledger search tool for an identity use case has to be
performant, intuitive, and trusted. Solving the first two criteria
can be solved by maintaining a local copy of the ledger in
a suitable persistent storage and integrating full-text search
software such as Elasticsearch [48] or Apache Solr into our
software stack (note, that both Apache Solr and Elasticsearch
are based on Apache Lucene [49]). Fetching transactions from
the ledger each time would clearly limit the responsiveness of
our system, and it would also make integration to any full-
text search software at least cumbersome if not impossible.
If Hyperledger Indy along with SSI gets worldwide adoption,
there would potentially be millions of schemas and creden-
tial definitions on the ledger, proportional to the number of
organizations worldwide.
Furthermore, we need a microservice regularly polling the
ledger for new transactions and inserting them into a database
or another solution with proper storage capabilities. Creating
and regularly updating an index could also become useful
in the future for achieving low query response times. Using
a database for storing the contents of the ledger would be
a convenient choice for general purpose usage, and as the
records are essentially JSON-LD objects one can think of a
popular NoSQL database. On the other hand, full-text search
solutions such as Apache Solr or Elasticsearch can also serve
as a persistent storage for the local read-only ledger copy.
A high-level overview of integrating the process into the
SSI identification workflow is illustrated in Figure 2.
5Alastria Website: https://alastria.io/en/, accessed on 28.8.2019
A question we should adhere is if we need to keep scal-
ability in mind, when designing a search system for identity
on a global scale. The answer is partially yes, as we need to
maintain a local copy of the ledger. An option for achieving
performance gains by using only relevant transaction types
to maintain a separate database for the full-text search. As
Hyperledger Indy keeps the vast majority of the data off-chain,
we do not need to rely on software with big data capabilities
even when Sovrin will be used on a global scale. So in our case
sharding is sufficient to address the future storage needs of a
full-text search service designed for long term maintainability.
At the moment a simple in-memory full-text search library
would also be sufficient, as the Sovrin Main Net currently
contains less then 100 schema and credential definitions to-
gether, but this is due to the early stage of SSI. However,
if SSI gets worldwide adoption, then we would need to be
able to handle at least millions of schemas and credential
definitions, proportional to the number of legal entities, with
potentially numerous attributes, so simply storing and filtering
these records would also need additional measures on the
backend side.
When designing how to include the full-text search function-
ality into the backend, more decoupled architectures provide
more flexibility, and the complexity of the feature is also in
support of not including it into a single monolithic backend
along with other SSI and non-SSI related business logic.
Designing the architecture for our full-text search engine
also requires understanding the semantics of the ledger trans-
actions, the relationships between them, and our use case. For
example, the alias field in NYM transactions is potentially
valuable for the full-text search, as it can include a human
readable name for the holder of the DID. As the alias
field is not present in SCHEMA and CLAIM_DEF (credential
definition) transactions of Hyperledger Indy, we can enrich
them with this information for more relevant search results
with user input similar to the alias of the user is included
in the query, like "Desert Schools Credit Union". Such en-
hancements require more preprocessing and also program calls
for accessing previous records of the ledger to the full-text
search engine. SCHEMA transactions also contain a name
attribute under the path txn.data.data.name in the
JSON-LD document, which is not included in CLAIM_DEF
transactions. But CLAIM_DEF transactions include a ref
attribute under the path txn.data.ref referring to the
txnMetadata.seqNo property of the respective SCHEMA,
so we can join SCHEMA and CLAIM_DEF as a preprocessing
step in order to enrich CLAIM_DEF transactions with the name
of the SCHEMA they are based on. Thus, we propose using a
full-text search engine along with a lightweight component for
downloading, preprocessing and enriching the ledger transac-
tions potentially along with an additional database for querying
related transactions during the preprocessing stage with the
purpose of appending information from related records.
For satisfying the trust criteria we first need to guarantee
the integrity of our local copy of the chain, and also make
sure that the examined credential is coming from a trusted
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Fig. 2. The full-text verifiable credential metadata search process integrated into the SSI workflow. First, the issuer sends a credential offer to the (identity)
holder. Then, the holder sends a credential request to the issuer. In the next step of the process the issuer sends the credential to the holder. Then, our proposed
full-text search system is used by the verifier for formulating relevant restrictions about trusted credentials. The steps for bootstrapping our full-text search
service are as follows: (1) the ledger copy service retrieves transactions from the verifiable data registry, (2) then the ledger copy service preprocesses the
records of the verifiable data registry and inserts them into the full-text search engine. Now, the verifier can already query the full-text search engine for
finding relevant credential definitions or schemata. Once the proper schemata and credential definitions are selected, the verifier sends a proof request to the
holder. Upon receiving the proof request, the holder can decide to respond by sending a cryptographically verifiable proof to the verifier. For the sake of
simplicity, we have excluded the steps for establishing pairwise connections between different parties (issuer, holder, and verifier) and verifying the received
proof based on the verifiable data registry. The abbreviation txs stands for transactions.
source. Verifying the integrity of the local copy is easier
than satisfying the trust criteria towards the issuer, and this
is something that anyone is able to perform. In this paper,
we will assume that the alias field in NYM transactions
can be relied on for our purposes, and as we are focusing
on public permissioned ledgers, namely Hyperledger Indy and
Sovrin, we can also assign a certain level of trust towards the
information stored on the ledger.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
An easy and up-to-date way to implement the SSI search
service is to package each component as a docker container.
The search service used by the frontend can be accessed
through a REST API.
A. Full-text Search Engine
For a convenient and intuitive search service we need at
least full-text search, so the verifiers can conviniently search
for schemas and credential definitions on the ledger. We often
want to find credential definitions which contain information
we can only roughly specify. For example, we would like
to find ID card credential definitions, which might be called
simply ID, ID card, personal ID, etc..
1) Apache Solr: We decided to use Apache Solr, as it
is an open source and completely free to use software. For
commercial purposes one might also consider Elasticsearch or
any other software offering a rich full-text search functionality.
Apache Solr is also part of the standard Cloudera Hadoop in-
stallation targeting big data environments, it supports sharding
and replication, so it would be a good solution even if the
ledger becomes very large.
2) Local ledger Copy: First, we can examine how others
have implemented software that fetches the ledger and persists
it in a on-premises storage. The open source software Indyscan
is using MongoDB for storing the ledger [50]. However,
maintaining a local database is not crucial for a basic full
text search in our case. We can simply add the documents
to Solr, for example with REST requests in Javascript. For
a responsive search we need an up-to-date local copy of the
examined ledger maintained in a database under our control in
our own infrastructure. MongoDB is a convenient choice for
storing the Sovrin ledger, as the individual records are valid
JSON documents. For connecting to the Sovrin Mainnet we
were using our own REST API. By simply providing the pool
genesis transaction file we can connect to the Indy ledger,
and then we retrieve the ledger transactions for persisting
them in a local MongoDB. This can be done by a simple
Javascript program, which is periodically polling the ledger for
new transactions. In the beginning, the program is requesting
transactions as fast as possible, and once the local ledger copy
is up to date, it is enough to poll for new transactions with a
much lower frequency. During fetching the records we can also
enrich and preprocess them in a way that enhances the full-
text search process. For example, we can add human readable
information about the author of the transaction containing the
specific credential definition or schema.
B. DIMS API
The DIMS API is a REST API wrapping the functionality of
the Indy SDK and simplifying its usage. We have also used it
to implement and demonstrate proof of concept SSI issuer and
verifier web applications. By using the IDChain/DIMS API we
can easily build web applications utilizing DIDs and Verifiable
Credentials powered by Hyperledger Indy. Our REST API can
also be used to create a local copy of the contents of the Indy
ledger. We can also specify ranges of transactions, so we do
not need an individual call per transaction, saving most of the
network round trip time that would otherwise be needed with
one transaction retrieved per query.
As a major focus of Hyperledger Indy is the privacy of
the identity holder, which means that private information is
primarily stored in the wallet of the user. Our DIMS API
uses MongoDB for storing the wallets of the user, which
contains credentials, connections and other necessary account
information. We also have a cloud agent implementation
serving as a persistent endpoint and forwarding messages to
the users of our API, which is needed, because end users do
not have a fix IP address where they are reachable all the time.
Cloud agents with Hyperledger Indy do not need to have the
full trust of the identity holder, as they are unable to decrypt
the messages they are forwarding to the user.
C. Frontend
We also need to think about how to implement the search
functionality on the UI side. On the frontend side we only
need to be able to access the REST API of the chosen
full-text search engine. We only need a single HTTP GET
request for querying, and in the response the relevant records
of the ledger are returned. For the query only a single text
field is necessary. On the other hand, depicting the results
depends on the use case. In case of the verifiable credential
search we should be able to show detailed information about
a credential definition upon interest and also select one or
multiple credential definitions for creating a proof request.
V. EVALUATION
Without an intuitive full-text search functionality for the
ledger we would either have to rely on hard coded restrictions
for credentials like credential definition IDs or a cumbersome
way of directly looking up such information at the individual
websites of issuers (provided it is mentioned there). Another
option would be to manually go through all ledger transactions
on a website like indyscan.io. The best alternative at the
moment would be to use the VONX Mainnet search [51], but
using it would still require understanding the semantics of
the Indy ledger, which cannot be required from an end user.
Furthermore, one can also not search transactions by relying
on the alias of a certain user at the moment. In addition, our
ledger search functionality is designed to be integrated into
the application a verifier is using, meaning that it is the most
convenient option to use according to our current knowledge,
as the VONX Mainnet search would involve an additional step.
A possibility to look into for simplifying the process without
loosing flexibility would be to be able to decide automatically
using a complex business logic or machine learning algorithm
if a credential credential can be accepted or not.
A. The need for full-text search
If we simply rely on filtering verifiable credentials, then
we need exact matches for specific attributes. With full-text
search we can find relevant content even with typos and just
partially matching user input. Thus, we can safely assume
that a full-text search would significantly improve the user
experience and potentially lead to higher recall in retrieving
relevant information about credentials found on the ledger.
B. Use cases
In addition to the use case of the online housing platform
mentioned in Section I, there are many other promising
ways to utilize textual queries for retrieving metadata about
credentials stored on the ledger.
We could also think of an online self-service loan on an
e-commerce platform, where the identity holder sends him-
self/herself a proof request for the proof of income certificate
credential definition written on the ledger by his employer
using user friendly full-text search. In addition, we can think
of an interactive usage, when a person (holder) is applying for
a loan in a shop, and tells the salesperson (verifier) the name of
his/her employer, and the verifier then uses our full-text search
service to find information about the proof of employment
credential for that specific employer and then send a proof
request.
Furthermore, an employee of the human resources depart-
ment of an organization would need to be able to ask for a
wide variety of credentials like university degrees, ID cards,
drivers license, documents about previous employment history,
and for the sake of simplicity necessary information about
credentials could be retrieved by using full-text search on the
ledger. A self-service version of the previous scenario is when
the identity holder logs in at the webpage of the organization
and searches for credentials issued by a specific issuer from
a potentially very large pool of trusted candidates, like an
attestation of sickness from any medical doctor, and then sends
a proof request to herself. Another example is, when an IT
person configuring and maintaining an Indy edge agent verifier
software for a specific client could search for trusted credential
definitions and issuers.
C. Potential Users of the Full-text Search
The full-text search can be employed for a variety of
worfklows and use cases. This paper mainly focuses on the
employing full text search on the verifier or the issuer side.
D. Need for Updating the List of accepted Credential Types
The list of issuers is continuously growing, thus verifiers
would often need to be informed about new issuers. For
example, in case of a proof of employment credential, each
employer can be an issuer. Furthermore, newer versions of
the schema would also need to be found. A possible way for
maintaining an up to date list of relevant credential definitions,
schemas and issuers for a proof request is to regularly search
for new relevant content on our local copy of the ledger,
which could be performed by the operator/maintainer of an
application with verification functionality.
E. The Potential Size of the Pool of Credential Types
Note, that the list of potential employers world wide is much
too long to include in an ordinary proof request. According to
datapo [52], there are millions of companies and entrepreneurs
registered worldwide, meaning that a comprehensive proof of
employment list is highly impractical or not even feasible to
send in practice in a proof request, so if Hyperledger Indy
gets worldwide adoption, we would either need to be able to
find a likely relevant subset of credential definitions by using
additional information, or we could rely on proof offers from
the identity holder and that every entity writing credential
definitions on the permissioned ledger can be trusted. Note,
that at the moment, we did not find an implementation for
proof offers with the Hyperledger Indy SDK, and these are
included in a Hyperledger Aries RFC [53], which is in
accepted status as of September 2, 2019. As Hyperledger Indy
is a permissioned ledger, where the right to be able to write on
the ledger (the role of trust anchor) can be granted by Sovrin
stewards, the question is if verifiers trust them. If complete
blind, trust is the case, then verifiers could also just send
proof requests with no restrictions about credential definitions.
However, we are still skeptical if each verifier would accept
accept any credential. Thus, two main options are: 1) the
identity holder tells the verifier about his employer’s proof
of employment certificate, or 2) the verifier maintains a list of
potential credential definition IDs that include a large portion
of the relevant records.
Still, even in this scenario, issuers would need to be able to
find relevant schemas and credential definitions on the ledger,
in order to be able to issue credentials with a set of attributes
that are widely accepted by verifiers. In order to fulfill this
requirement, we would either need use case specific schemas
that issuers implicitly agree on, or another way to be able
to have a wide agreement on attribute names among issuers.
For example, with a proof of employment credential we cloud
agree on the attributes: name, company and title. Now the
question is how will issuers be able to specify matching
attribute names, and our answer is that the easiest way is to
look at the ledger, as all credential definitions and schemas
and stored on the blockchain in case of Hyperledger Indy. For
being able to find relevant schemas and credential definitions
easily, issuers can rely on our full-text search service.
Alternatives to our search service could be either trying to
find information online or be informed on relevant attribute
names by use case dependent third parties, such as a govern-
ment in case of a proof of employment credential. Finding
information online would be an extra overhead, and it would
be much better for the user experience on the issuer side, if
the attribute selection could be solved by a full-text ledger
search functionality by either finding a proper schema for the
credential definition to be created, or by retrieving a set of
schema and credential definitions that can serve as a basis for
specifying the right attribute names.
F. Interactive Initiation of the Identification Process on the
Holder Side
Another valid question is if the identity holder just tell the
Verifier the credential definition ID. The credential definition
ID is not human readable, so even if it is sent in an automated
way, the verifier will have to look the respective credential
definition on the ledger and decide if that is appropriate for
the specific scenario. So even with a proof offer, the verifier
will have to look at the ledger and decide if the suggested
credential is appropriate. A proof offer could be an alternative
for the verifiable credential search in a scenario where the
identity holder and verifier persons are negotiating the proof
in an interactive manner, as long as the identity holder only has
a number of credentials that he/she can manually go through.
If the identity holder has a hundreds of credentials, then he/she
would also need to rely on a search functionality, but this time
the place to search would be the own wallet.
G. Obtaining a Matching Credential
Furthermore, it is also possible that the identity holder does
not have a matching credentials, which means he/she will
need to obtain one from a list of possible credential types.
For being able to select the credential the holder will try to
acquire simple filtering is also sufficient as long as the number
of matching credential definitions (according to Hyperledger
Indy terminology) is not too long, because the holder can
manually go through the list of accepted credentials. If the
list is too long, then we will again need an intuitive full-text
search functionality for the convenience of the user.
H. Trust
Trust is generally a central question when working with
blockchains, and our case is no exception. With SSI the
authenticity of verifiable credentials can be cryptographically
verified, but then trust in the issuer of the credentials is
needed. This aligns well with the notion described in the
paper authored by Heiss [54] that contents on the chain need
to be trusted. In the case of Hyperledger Indy, the Sovrin
foundation has to make sure, that trust anchors are indeed
widely trusted entities by society when it comes to credentials
they issue. As Sovrin stewards are already a large consortium
of reputable organizations, we can safely assume that they
have the necessary capacity to evaluate which organizations
are qualified to become trust anchors. If we were able to trust
issuers in general, this could save us tremendous efforts by
reducing the need to formulate proper restrictions on which
credentials can automatically be trusted, and the business
processes with Hyperledger Indy could be automatized to a
higher extent.
I. Security
First, we would like to emphasize again that no private data
is stored on the chain with Hyperledger Indy even in encrypted
form. In this paper, we only search for information that is
meant to be public, for example schemas, credential definitions
and public DIDs of issuers.
For the security of the user, we only need to make sure,
that the local ledger copy is not tampered with. Once we have
access to the genesis transaction, we can easily perform this
upon receiving the transactions in the order they were created.
As the full-text ledger search can also be employed for
verifying information about credentials displayed on other
media, we can state that it can be beneficial for improving
the security of applications utilizing SSI.
J. Performance
We have conducted performance benchmarks of our full-text
search service deployed on a commodity machine. We have
tested the throughput using the wrk package with using 400
open connections and a single thread. The performance of five
query types were evaluated, namely querying 1) schemas or
credential definitions by schema name, 2) schema by schema
name, 3) transactions from a specific person with a typo
in the name, 4) credential definition by schema name, and
5) credential definition by attribute name. Our local Solr
instance contained the first 47312 domain transactions of the
Sovrin main net. Our current benchmarks show that a single
node Solr setup can serve up to 16000 requests per second
depending on the type of query. Thus, we can conclude that
our full-text search service is more performant than necessary.
The performance metrics could significantly change in the
future, as SSI is currently in an early stage, and the Sovrin
ledger will contain more transactions by potentially orders of
magnitude if they achieve worldwide adoption. The results of
our measurements are depicted in Figure 3.
Note that Apache Solr indexes can be replicated over
multiple nodes, which lets us safely assume linear performance
scaling. Solr also offers index sharding, which could be useful
if the Sovrin ledger becomes too large. The scaling of sharded
indexes can also be achieved by manually replicating them
across several Solr clusters.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have envisioned how a verifiable credentials based
ecosystem could be functioning on a global scale through
the means of Self-sovereign Identity, where in our scenario
a full-text search feature helps the users of the system retrieve
necessary information for trusted and automatic verification.
We have implemented and evaluated a prototype full-text cre-
dential metadata search service, which serves as a proof of our
concept. Our text based search engine could help verifiers find
credential types relevant for their use-cases created by trusted
issuers among millions of potential candidates, which would
be a requirement for a worldwide used verifiable credential
system.
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Fig. 3. The performance of our full-text search service powered by Solr
(single node deployment on commodity hardware). The throughput of the
search service has been measured over varying query types.
A. Future Work
Interoperability is a major requirement for SSI, and the
standardization by the World Wide Web Consortium has the
promise of helping it. Potential next steps could be extending
the full text search functionality to support uPort, Jolocom,
and other SSI software as well. Furthermore, the Hyperledger
Aries project [32] also aims to achieve interoperability with
verifiable credentials.
1) Integrity verification of the chain: For prooving that we
are searching on an untampered version of the chain we need
to check its integrity. In order to verify the blockchain we need
to recompute the hashes of the transactions. When using Hy-
perledger Indy, we would have to follow the computationally
efficient Merkle tree specific verification process. As we are
periodically polling the ledger, we can integrate the verification
process into the regular update mechanism looking for new
transactions.
2) Schema Overlays: The idea of using overlays [55] has
emerged in the Hyperledger Indy community. Overlays would
provide additional contextual and conditional information
about schemas for SSI capable applications and services, and
they would be a rich source to incorporate in our full-text
search, once they are available and used.
B. Final Word
In conclusion, full-text search is a useful and promising tool
for building a verifiable credential ecosystem that can easily
and flexibly play along with other approaches in creating an
efficient verification process between holders and verifiers.
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